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I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
executed a Trust Agreement which created the Norman Anderson Trust 
(the "Trust"). (Rec. 2, Para. 5). 
2. On or about November 28, 1978, Plaintiff Anna Lee 
Anderson executed a Trust Agreement which created the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust. (Rec. 2, Para. 6). 
3. Shortly after the execution of the Trust Agreement 
establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman Anderson transferred 
certain property into the Trust. Included in the transfer were 
2 0,500 shares of the common stock of Levi Strauss & Co. (Rec. 3, 
Para. 8). 
4. James N. Anderson, son of Norman and Anna Lee 
Anderson, was designated by the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement as 
the Trustee for the Trust. (Rec. 3, Para. 9; Rec. 146, Para. 2; 
Rec. 152, Para 4). 
5. Anna Lee Anderson is the sole Beneficiary of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 147, Para. 2). 
6. On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson 
established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. at 
its Salt Lake City office. (Rec. 3, Para. 10). 
7. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished a 
copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time the Trust 
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Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Rec. 
3, Para. 11; Rec. 147, Para. 4). 
8. Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a copy 
of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement to its trust department 
located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San 
Francisco, California. (Rec. 3, Para. 12). 
9. The Dean Witter Reynolds trust department in San 
Francisco, California reviewed the Trust Agreement and sent 
directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of 
the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 3-4, Para. 13.) 
10. On or about May 8, 199 0, Defendant Ralph Pahnke 
prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. which provided for the distribution of 41,000 shares 
of the common stock of Levi Strauss & Co. as follows: 
(a) 24,118 shares were distributed to the personal 
securities account of James N. Anderson at Dean Witter Reynolds; 
(b) 16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Rec. 5, Para 
21; Rec. 147, Para 5). 
11. The value of the Levi Strauss & Co. stock 
distributed to James N. Anderson amounted to $871,2 3 8.63. (Rec. 5, 
Para 22). 
12. The value of the Levi Strauss & Co. stock 
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distributed to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36. 
(Rec. 5, Para. 23) . 
13. Both of the distributions referenced hereinabove 
were in direct violation of the provisions, terms and conditions of 
the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement which was in the possession of 
Defendant Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Rec. 5, 
Para. 24; Rec. 153, Para. 9). 
14. Subsequent to said distributions, Defendant Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the accounts of James N. 
Anderson and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust. During the period Dean 
Witter Reynolds1 managed these accounts, they became valueless. 
(Rec. 5, Para. 25). 
15. The distributions induced and effected by Defendants 
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful, and in direct 
contravention of the provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement. (Rec. 5, Para. 25; Rec. 153, Para 9). 
16. James N. Anderson, as Trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust, never questioned the propriety of the transfers from the 
Norman Anderson Trust due to his reliance upon Defendant Pahnke and 
Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds and, consequently, never disclosed 
to the beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson, the transfer of those assets 
until December, 1990. (Rec. 147-48, Para 6). 
17. Anna Lee Anderson, the sole beneficiary of the 
Norman Anderson Trust, never examined a copy of the Trust until 
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December, 1990. (Rec. 152, Para 5). 
18. In preparation for an arbitration hearing with 
respect to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust in December, 1990, Anna Lee 
Anderson, discovered that the assets which were supposed to be 
deposited in the Norman Anderson Trust had been transferred in 
direct contravention of the terms of the Trust to the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust and the personal account of James N. Anderson. 
(Rec. 153, Para. 9; Rec. 155, Para. 15). 
19. Upon discovering that the transfer of assets out of 
the Norman Anderson Trust was inappropriate, attorneys for the Anna 
Lee Anderson Trust attempted to have the issue of the inappropriate 
transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust determined at the 
pending arbitration hearing, but were advised by the arbitrators to 
seek resolution of those issues in a separate proceeding. (Rec. 
153-54, Para 11). 
20. Upon discovering the wrongful transfer of assets 
from the Norman Anderson Trust in December, 199 0, Anna Lee Anderson 
caused the original Complaint giving rise to this action to be 
filed in Third District Court in December, 1990. (Rec. 154, Para. 
12) . 
21. On or about April 15, 1991, Defendants Dean Witter 
Reynolds and Pahnke filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint 
contending that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue as beneficiary and 
claiming the Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust was an 
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indispensable party to the action. (Rec. 40). 
22. Subsequent to the conclusion of the arbitration 
proceeding dealing with the Anna Lee Anderson Trust, Anna Lee 
Anderson requested the resignation of James N. Anderson as Trustee 
of the Norman Anderson Trust and designated David M. Dudley as 
Successor Trustee. (Rec. 154, Para 13). 
23. On July 16, 1991 the District Court issued a minute 
entry granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. 91). 
24. On or about July 22, 1991, Plaintiff filed an 
Amended Complaint naming David M. Dudley, the Successor Trustee, as 
Plaintiff. (Rec. 92) . 
25. On or about August 7, 1991, Defendants filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contending that 
Plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. (Rec. 139). 
26. The District Court executed and entered the Order 
dismissing the original Complaint on September 16, 1991. (Rec. 
214) . 
27. The District Court executed and entered the Order 
dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on September 27, 1991. 
(Rec. 218). 
28. On October 9, 1991, Plaintiff filed her Notice of 
Appeal appealing both orders dismissing the original and Amended 
Complaints. (Rec. 224). 
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29. After all briefs had been filed, oral argument was 
held in the Court of Appeals before Judges Garff, Greenwood and 
Jackson on October 20, 1992. 
30. The Court of Appeals rendered its unanimous decision 
on November 13, 1992 which decision is reported at 200 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 65. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANNA LEE 
ANDERSON HAD STANDING TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
DISMISSING HER COMPLAINT 
In this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals properly 
determined that Anna Lee Anderson was a proper party to bring this 
appeal. Defendants claim that because Anna Lee Anderson had filed 
her original Complaint which was dismissed and then subsequently 
filed an Amended Complaint naming the Substitute Trustee as 
Plaintiff, she no longer had standing to appeal the dismissal of 
the original Complaint. It is important to note that although the 
dismissal of the original Complaint was granted on July 16, 1991, 
the Order granting dismissal was not executed and entered until 
September 16, 1991. (Rec. 214) . Moreover, both orders of 
dismissal executed by the trial Court denominated Anna Lee Anderson 
as Plaintiff. (Rec. 214, 218) Plaintiff filed her Notice of 
Appeal challenging that Order on October 9, 1991, well within the 
thirty (30) days allowed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(Rec. 224). 
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Consequently the Utah Court of Appeals correctly 
determined that Anna Lee Anderson had standing to appeal the 
dismissal of her original Complaint. The Order appealed from was 
a final Order and had been signed by the Court. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Lavton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979). The mere filing of 
the Amended Complaint did not deprive Anna Lee Anderson of her 
standing to appeal dismissal of her original Complaint. Anna Lee 
Anderson was the proper party to appeal the dismissal of this 
action. She was the one person who had suffered harm from the 
actions of the Defendants and who had a direct interest in the 
outcome of the case. Finally, the issues at hand could not be 
reviewed if Anna Lee Anderson were denied standing. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT ANNA LEE ANDERSON 
WAS THE PROPER PARTY TO BRING SUIT FOR VIOLATION OF THE TRUST 
AGREEMENT. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals determined that Anna 
Lee Anderson, as beneficiary of the Trust, was the proper party to 
file suit in this matter. The Court determined that " . . . Anna 
Lee Anderson stated a cause of action against the Appellees because 
she could prove facts showing she had standing as beneficiary to 
pursue the claim." Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742, 745 (Utah App. 1992). Relying upon the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, §282 (1976), the Court found that the Trustee 
had neglected to bring an action against the third party and 
therefore the beneficiary was the proper party to bring suit. This 
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position is well settled and supported by numerous cases and 
learned treatises on trusts• See, e.g., IV A. Scott, The Law of 
Trusts, §294.1 at 99 (4th Ed. 1989); Chicago City Bank & Trust 
Company v. Lesman, 542 N.E.2d 824 (111. 1989); Fortune v. First 
Union National Bank, 371 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. 1988); Edcreworth v. First 
National Bank of Chicago, 677 F.Supp. 982 (S.D.Ind. 1988); Hoyle v. 
Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18 (Ariz. 1987); Alioto v. United States, 593 
F.Supp. 1402 (N.D.Cal. 1984); Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of 
Montgomery, N.A., 471 S.2d 1238 (Ala. 1982); Velez v. Feinstein, 
451 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. 1982); Apollinari v. Johnson, 305 N.W.2d 565 
(Mich.Ct.App. 1981) ; Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 
F.Supp. 755 (D.N.J. 1957) ; Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 Utah 
372, 290 P. 161 (1930). Consequently, the determination of the 
Court of Appeals that Anna Lee Anderson was the proper party 
Plaintiff was well supported and should not be disturbed. 
III. DEFENDANT'S HAVE FAILED TO SHOW ANY COMPELLING REASON FOR THE 
SUPREME COURT TO GRANT THEIR PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI. 
In their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Defendants 
contend that the Utah Court of Appeals1 decision " . . . departs 
from accepted judicial proceedings within the meaning of Rule 46(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." (Pet. at 2). Rule 
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important reasons. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme 
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Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons 
that will be considered: 
c. When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision; 
In their Petition, Defendants assert that the Court of 
Appeals departed from accepted judicial proceedings by allowing 
Anna Lee Anderson to appeal the dismissal of her original 
Complaint• Defendants claim that after dismissal of her original 
Complaint, Anna Lee Anderson filed an Amended Complaint whereby the 
Substitute Trustee was named as a party Plaintiff and Anna Lee 
Anderson thereby lost her standing to appeal the dismissal of the 
original Complaint. As discussed supra, Plaintiff had standing to 
appeal the Order. The Order dismissing Plaintiff's original 
Complaint was executed on September 16, 1991. Plaintiff filed her 
Notice of Appeal on October 9, 1991, less than thirty (30) days 
after entry of the final Order. Consequently, Plaintiff had every 
right to appeal the Third District Court's Order dismissing her 
original Complaint. Appellees' assertion that the Court of Appeals 
departed from accepted judicial proceedings is simply without 
merit. 
Appellees further claim that the Court or Appeals ". . . 
decided an important question of state appellate jurisdiction which 
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has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court pursuant 
to Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Once 
again, however, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that 
Plaintiff was the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal for the 
wrongful dismissal of her original Complaint. The case law 
supporting Plaintiff's claims against Defendants as beneficiary of 
the Trust are numerous as previously cited. Further, the case law 
is replete with examples of cases supporting the Court of Appeals 
finding that Anna Lee Anderson had standing to appeal the dismissal 
of her original complaint. Seef e.g., Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987); Olson v. Salt 
Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986); Kennecott 
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985); Jenkins v. 
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983). See, also, Roberts-Henry v. 
Richter, 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo.App. 1990); Montana Power Co. v. Dept. 
of Public Serv. Reg. , 709 P.2d 995 (Mont. 1985). Consequently, the 
Court of Appeals' determination that Plaintiff was a proper party 
to bring the appeal and that she was further the proper party to 
prosecute the original Complaint as beneficiary of the Trust was 
entirely appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants have failed to show any compelling ground for 
the Utah Supreme Court to review the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in this matter. Consequently, Defendants1 Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this // day of February 
MORT 
JAMES E. MORTON 
RONALD C. WOLTHUIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE ¥ 
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Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Reid E. Lewis, Esq. 
E. Jay Sheen, Esq. 
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600 Deseret Plaza 
15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84%£l 
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Anna Lee ANDERSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC, 
Ralph Pahnke, and John Does 
Through 25, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 920228-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov 13, 1992. 
Beneficiary of express trust sued 
stockbroker and brokerage firm alleging 
improper distribution of trust assets. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. 
Dennis Frederick, J., dismissed complaint 
on ground that beneficiary did not have 
standing to sue. Beneficiary appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J , held that 
beneficiary could prove facts showing she 
had standing to bring suit for the improper 
distribution of the stock sufficient to with-
stand motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim 
Reversed and remanded 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>863, 919 
When reviewing motion to dismiss 
based on failure to state a claim, appellate 
court must accept material allegations that 
the complaint is true, and the trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly 
appears the complainant can prove no set 
ANDERSON v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. Utah 743 
a t e M Ml PJtd 742 (Utah App 1992) 
of facts in support of his or her claims. 
Rules Civ Proc , Rules 12(bX6) 
2. Appeal and Error <3=*919 
On appeal grant of motion to dismiss 
for failure to state claim, facts of complaint 
are to be liberally construed and the court 
must consider all the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the facts in light most 
favorable to plaintiff. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rules 12(b)(6) 
3. Pretrial Procedure <s=>622 
Dismissal of complaint for failure to 
state a claim is proper if the plaintiff fails 
to properly allege standing Rules Civ 
Proc, Rules 12(bX6), 17 
4. Trusts <£=*345 
Although Rule of Civil Procedure that 
permits trustee of express trust to sue in 
that person's name without joining the par-
ty for whose benefit the action is brought, 
the rule does not prevent the beneficiary 
from suing third parties directly Rules 
Civ Proc, Rule 17 
5 Trusts <S=*345 
Statute empowering trustee to sue on 
behalf of beneficiary does not preclude ben-
eficiary from suing m capacity as beneficia-
ry U C A 1953, 75-7-402(3Xz) 
6. Trusts <£=>345 
Beneficiary has nght to bring an ac-
tion against a third party when the benefi-
ciary's interests are hostile to those of the 
trustee 
7. Trusts <3=>345 
In view of fact that beneficiary of ex-
press trust could show, at very least, that 
trustee improperly "neglected" to bring ac-
tion against stockbroker and brokerage 
firm when trustee waited over ten years 
after improper transfer of trust assets and 
still did not bring suit, beneficiary could 
prove facts showing that she had standing 
to bnng action sufficient to withstand mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
Rules Civ Proc , Rules 12(bX6, 7), 17 
James E Morton, Ronald C Wolthuis, 
and Scott S Kunkel, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
Joseph J Palmer, Reid E Lewis, and E 
Jay Sheen, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
and appellees 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge 
Appellant, Anna Lee Anderson, appeals 
an order granting appellees' motion to dis-
miss based on Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), and 
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
We reverse and remand 
FACTS 
On November 20, 1978, Norman 
Anderson executed a trust agreement cre-
ating the Norman Anderson Trust. The 
trust was funded by stock held in a broker-
age account with Dean Witter, Inc. (Dean 
Witter). Dean Witter had a copy of the 
trust agreement that outlined the terms 
and conditions for disbursement of trust 
assets. James Anderson, the son of Nor-
man Anderson, was named as trustee for 
the trust Anna Lee Anderson, the wife of 
Norman Anderson, was the sole beneficiary 
of the trust 
On May 8, 1980, stock was distributed, in 
violation of the terms of the trust, from the 
trust mto accounts James Anderson and 
Anna Lee Anderson held with Dean Witter 
The distribution was made pursuant to a 
letter authorizing the distribution prepared 
by Ralph Pahnke, an employee of Dean 
Witter Subsequent to the distribution of 
the stock, Dean Witter continued to man-
age Anna Lee Anderson s account During 
the term of Dean Witters management, 
the assets held in Anna Lee Anderson s 
account became worthless 
When Anna Lee Anderson learned of the 
improper distributions in December 1990, 
she filed a complaint against Pahnke and 
Dean Witter on December 6, 1990 She 
sought damages for breach of contract, 
tortious interference with contract breach 
of fiduciary dut> and negligence The de 
fendants filed a motion to dismiss on \pril 
744 Utah $41 PACIFIC REPORTER, ^ d SERIES 
15,1991, alleging that the complaint failed 
to^ state a plaim pursuant .to Rule 12(bX6) 
6ecause trie proper psjrty dKinot dnng tide 
complaint and that the complaint failed to 
name the trustee as an indispensable party 
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19.1 The 
trial court entered an order dismissing the 
complaint on September 16, 1991. 
ISSUES 
On appeal, Anna Lee Anderson contends 
her complaint was improperly dismissed be-
cause: (1) she was a proper party to bring 
the suit, and (2) the trustee was not an 
indispensable party to the action. 
1. After a minute entry dismissing the complaint, 
but prior to the entry of the order formally 
dismissing the complaint, Anna Lee Anderson 
attempted to file a document labeled "Amended 
Complaint" naming a substituted trustee as a 
party in the caption of the document. Other-
wise the document was identical to the com-
plaint. Accordingly, it was in substance an at-
tempt to substitute a party plaintiff. The trial 
court granted the motion to dismiss the 
"Amended Complaint" on September 27, 1991. 
The order did not state any ground or basis for 
the ruling but the mouon claimed a statute of 
limitations bar. Although Anna Lee Anderson 
also appealed the dismissal of the "Amended 
Complaint," we need not reach that issue be-
cause we are reversing the dismissal of the 
original complaint. 
Appellees claim Anderson cannot appeal the 
original complaint because she was not listed as 
trial Court's ruling no deference and review 
it under a correctness .standard." . /dj#*t 
ANALYSIS 
Th6 appellees allege that Anna^l^e 
Andean, as a beneficiary to the Irust, 
was r^ ot the proper party to -bring /s3ft 
against them. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 
12(bX6)f appellees allege Anna * -Lee 
Ande*50n failed to state a claim because 
she did not have a nexus with the claim. 
The ^ial court agreed and dismissed the 
compl^t, finding the trustee should haye 
brought the suit rather than the beneficia-
a
 P * ^ to the "Amended Complaints However, 
**j^ f Use we are not reaching the issues present-
ed if\ the "Amended Complaint" and subsequent 
mot
*on to dismiss, and because Anderson is 
aPP^aiing a final order, we find that Anderson 
Pr0Perly appealed the dismissal of the original 
com
*)lainL See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 
6 0 0
 t\2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979). 
^•
u1e 17 seeks to protect the interests of judi-
cial t c o n o m y ancj fairness to the parties m liti-
&&°n. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 
(Utah 1984). 'The reason the defendant has the 
n 8 n t to have the cause of action prosecuted by 
*he real party in interest is so that the judgment 
W l
" preclude any action on the same demand 
by ahother and permit the defendant to assert 
*" defenses or counterclaims available against 
m e real owner of the cause." Id. (quoting Shaw 
v Jehpson, 121 Utah 155, 163, 239 P.2d 745, 748 
(195%)). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] When reviewing a motion to dis-
miss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate 
court must accept the material allegations 
of the complaint as true, and the trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears the complainant can prove 
no set of facts in support of his or her 
claims'. Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 
(Utah 1991)V* Colman v. Utah State Land 
BcL, 795 P.2d^622, 624 (Utah 1990). The 
facts of the complaint are to be liberally 
construed and the court must consider all 
£hei teasbnable inferences to be drawn from 
the facts in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St 
Benedict's Hosp:, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 
1991). "Because the propriety of a 12(bX6) 
dismissal is a question of law, we give the 
[3] Dismissal of a complaint underl ie 
12(bX6) is proper if the plaintiff fails fo 
properly allege standing. See Ashe Creek 
Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 872 
(10th Cir.1992); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas 
&»&> 868 F& 1147,1149 (10th Cir.), cefi. 
denie^ 493 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct 76, 107 
L.Ed.^ d 43 (1989). Rule 17 provides insight 
concerning standing to sue in a trust ac-
tion: ''Every action shall be prosecuted in 
the n^me 0f the real party in interest.,.. 
JA] trustee of an express trust ... ' may 
sue ii\ that person's name without joining 
the p^rty for whose benefit the action is 
brought" Utah R.Civ.P. 17 (1992) (empha-
sis a4ded).2 
..M»$] Although Rule 17 clearly allows 
the trustee to sue on behalf of the benefi-
ANDERSON v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. Utah 7 4 5 
Cite a* 841 P.2d 742 (UtahApp. 1992) 
ciary, it does liot prevent the beneficiary 
from suing third parties directly: 
It should be noted that the enumer-
ations [e.g., trustee and guardian] are 
couched in permissive language. The 
beneficial owner, therefore, is not pre 
eluded from suing ^or from joining with 
the legal title holder, nor from being 
joined, if the beneficial owner has the 
right sought to be enforced. Whether he 
has . . . will be determined by principles 
of substantive law. 
3A James W. Moore, et al, Moore's Feder-
al Practice § 17.12 at 17-118. (2d ed. 
1992) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).3 
[6] Although Utah substantive law is 
especially sparse in this area, it appears the 
beneficiary has the right to bring an action 
against a third party when the beneficia-
ry's interests are hostile to those of the 
trustee. Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. 
Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P. 161 (1930). 
Other jurisdictions also allow a beneficiary 
to sue third parties directly. E.g., Alioto v. 
United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1412 
(N.D.Cal.1984) (in action where beneficiary 
has been damaged by trustee and third 
party, beneficiary may bring action against 
third party separately); Booth v. Security 
Mut Life Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp. 755, 761 
(D.NJ.1957) (where trustee transfers prop-
erty'in breach of trust with assistance of 
third parties, third parties are primarily 
liable to the beneficiary, rather than to the 
trustee; the right of the beneficiary 
against the third party is a direct right not 
derived through the trustee); Hoyle^v. 
Dickinson, 155 Ariz. 277, 279, 746 P.2d 18, 
20 (CtApp.1987) (trust beneficiary may 
bring action for damages against third par-
ty for breach of trust agreement); Apolli-
nari v. Johnson, 104 Mich.App. 673, 305 
N.W.2d 565, 567 (1981) (beneficiary may 
sue third party without joining trustee). 
Further, most jurisdictions follow the 
general rule set out in Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts § 282 (1976), providing in 
part: 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3)(z) (Supp 1992) 
also provides that a trustee has the power to 
"prosecute or defend actions, claims or proceed-
ings for the protection of the trust assets and of 
the trustee in the performance of his duties M 
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an 
action at law or suit in equity or other 
proceeding against a third person if the 
trustee held the property free of trust, 
the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in 
equity against the third person, except as 
stated in Subsections (2) and (3). 
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or 
neglects to bring an action against the 
third person, the beneficiary can main-
tain a suit in equity against the trustee 
and the third person. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[7] In the present situation, it is clear 
from the complaint the beneficiary could 
prove facts showing she had standing to 
bring suit against the third parties for the 
improper distribution of stock. She could 
show, at the very least, the trustee improp-
erly "neglected" to bring action against the 
appellees when he waited over ten years 
after the improper transfer and still did not 
bring suit See Struble v. New Jersey 
Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 
732 F.2d 325, 337 (3rd Cir.1984) (where 
trustee may sue and wrongfully fails to do 
so, the beneficiary may sue the party or 
parties the trustee failed to sue). 
We conclude Anna Lee Anderson stated 
a cause of action against the appellees be-
cause she could prove facts showing she 
had standing as beneficiary
 % to pursue the 
claim. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
finding the trustee was the only proper 
party to bring the action. Because we find 
that Anna Lee was a proper party to bring 
suit, we need not reach appellees claim that 
because the trustee was the only party 
eligible to bring the action, the trustee 
should have been named as an indispens-
able party pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly dismissed 
Anna Lee Anderson's complaint because it 
While this statute empowers the trustee to sue 
on behalf of the beneficiary, it does not pre-
clude Anderson from suing in her capacity as 
beneficiar>. 
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is clear that she could prove facts showing 
she has standing to bring claims as a bene-
ficiary against the appellees. Therefore, 
we reverse the decision of the trial court 
and remand the case for -further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. 
